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Due to the increase in labor force attachment of mothers of young children in the last 
decade, child care policies have a renewed importance. This paper uses Colombian 
data to perform a characterization of the child care market, generating stylized facts to 
inform the debate. The main trends are: highly informal market, high participation and 
employment rates of mothers of young children, relatively little “unmet need” for child 
care services and the poor facing constraints to access the market for child care, both in 
quantity and price. This study analyzes how Colombian families make their child care 
decisions, simultaneously choosing whether the mother works, whether to pay for care 
and  what  mode  to  use.  The  estimations  performed  suggest  that  there  is  a  strong 
positive effect of child care choice on the mother’s working decision, and that this effect 
is much higher for low-income families. As children grow the availability of formal care 
modes becomes determinant to enable the mother’s labor force attachment. 
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Dado  el  aumento  en  la  participación  en  el  mercado  laboral  de  madres  con  hijos 
pequeños, es pertinente dar una nueva mirada a los programas de cuidado infantil –
child care-. El presente estudio caracteriza el mercado de cuidado infantil para el caso 
Colombiano, generando hechos estilizados con el objetivo de informar el debate. Los 
rasgos más prominentes son: (i)  el mercado de cuidado infantil es altamente informal; 
(ii) se observan altas tasas de participación en el mercado laboral, y de empleo, de las 
madres  de  niños  pequeños;  (iii)  hay  poca  evidencia  de  “demanda  insatisfecha”  por 
servicios  de  cuidado  de  niños;  y  (iv)  las  familias  pobres  enfrentan  restricciones 
importantes, tanto en cantidad como en precio, en el acceso a dichos servicios. Se 
modelaron  las  decisiones  simultáneas  de  las  familias  Colombianas  en  cuanto  a 
elección de alternativa de cuidado de niños, si pagar o no por dicho cuidado y si la 
madre  trabaja  o  no.  Las  estimaciones  sugieren  que  existe  un  efecto  positivo  y 
significativo de la elección del tipo de cuidado de los niños sobre la decisión de trabajar 
de la madre y que este efecto es, además, mucho más alto para las familias de bajos 
ingresos. A medida que los niños crecen, la disponibilidad de alternativas formales de 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Child care is especially interesting today because of the tremendous growth in the labor 
force participation of females. In fact, one of the defining trends in Latin American labor 
markets is the increase in the female participation rate; the average participation rate 
increase in the region during the 90’s is 7.1% (Duryea, Jaramillo and Pagés, 2001). 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of female participation rates for Latin American countries. 
Colombia has one of the highest female participation rates among the Latin American 
countries, only surpassed by Brazil, Costa Rica and Honduras.  
Source: Duryea, Jaramillo and Pagés (2001) 
￿
Today, it is much more common for the mother of a young child to be employed. Thus, 
child care, especially for infants and toddlers (ages 0-2), is a much more prominent and 
important need. Employment of mothers with young children has grown over the last 
few decades outpacing the growth of any other large demographic group (Anderson and 
Levine, 1999). The participation rate of females with children between 0-5 in the USA in 
1998 was 63.7% (Blau, 2001). For the Colombian case, the participation rate of the 
same group was 58% in 2003 (Table 2).  
 
Poor women display significantly lower participation and employment rates than their 
wealthier counterpart, despite a tendency toward closing of the gap during the last few 
years.  The  variation  in  labor  market  participation  across  income  quintiles  is  high, 
ranging from 46 for the first, and increasing to peak at 76% for the wealthiest quintile. 
Employment  displays  a  similar  trend,  but  with  slightly  lower  rates.  Employment  of 
Figure 1. Evolution of Participation during the nineties:
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women in the first two quintiles is significantly lower than their wealthier counterparts: 
the employment rate of mothers from the fifth quintile is around twice the employment 
rate of women in the first two quintiles.  
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An inadequate supply of child care, due to lack of quantity and/or quality, has diverse 
negative effects on a society. For instance, it endangers the well-being of children due 
to the lack of early stimulation. “Extensive research in child care and early childhood 
education… shows that higher levels of quality are associated with enhanced social 
skills,  reduced  behavior  problems,  increased  cooperation  and  improved  language  in 
children.”
3 It also causes financial hardship and stress for families, prevents females 
from continuing their labor market attachments and makes it next to impossible for low 
income  families  to  work  their  way  above  the  poverty  line.  Thus,  the  public  policies 
efforts  devoted  to  this  issue  are  widely  felt  across  the  community,  because  of  the 
diversity of the effects it generates for families.  
 
For policy design, there is a trade-off between the two main objectives of child care: 
enhancing the development and well-being of children and facilitating the employment 
of  parents.  Since  high  quality  child  care  is  expensive  and  requires  high  degrees  of 
parent participation, and is frequently provided for shorter hours, then this form of care 
which greatly benefits the children is not necessarily the best for working parents. On 
the other hand, care with mediocre quality but longer hours frees up more parental time, 
but  does  not  provide  the  necessary  level  of  child  stimulation.  Therefore,  there  are 
several  possible  quantity-quality  combinations  that  can  be  provided  in  the  market, 
balancing the tension between them.  
 
The obstacle imposed by child care costs is not the same for all women. The availability 
of affordable and high quality child care enables women to continue productive careers 
in the labor force. However, high-skilled women with high potential market wages can 
better  access  different  quantity-quality  child  care  alternatives  than  low-skilled  ones. 
Hence, there could be differential responses to child care costs across levels of skill. An 
analysis of the existing public policy programs in this respect should analyze also the 
differential impacts on income groups. An example of this could be how responsive is 
the demand for child care and labor supply decisions to the cost of care. 
 
Child care availability and the public policies behind it are one of the factors contributing 
to  the  relative  female  success  in  the  Colombian  labor  market.  Understanding  this 
market is therefore important due to its high impact of family welfare, the implications for 
public policy design and redistributive potential, as well as the possibility of helping poor 
families overcome the care hurdle. However, there are no good characterizations of the 
                                                 
3 Love, Schochet and Mackstroth (1996) quoted in Blau (2001).   5 
market. The most critical aspect is the supply side, since an important percentage of the 
market is informal (private providers and informal arrangements) and it has not been 
captured in any survey. The available information from the publicly provided care is at a 
very  aggregate  level,  hindering  the  development  of  many  of  the  most  interesting 
analysis.  
 
In this paper, we will characterize the market for child care based on the information 
provided by the Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 2003 (ECV), and develop and estimate a 
model that analyzes the mother’s employment decision, the decision to pay for care and 
mode  choice,  abstracting  from  quality.  This  enables  us  to  understand  Colombian 
family’s  decisions  regarding  child  care,  and  how  each  variable  contributes  to  such 
decisions.  The  results  from  the  estimations are  used  to  quantify  effect  of  child  care 
provision on female employment status.  
 
In Section II we summarize the Institutional Background of the Colombian Institute for 
family Welfare (ICBF for its name in Spanish), while Section III presents a review of the 
relevant  Colombian  literature.  Section  IV  describes  de  data  and  characterizes  the 
market  for  child  care,  Section  V  discusses  the  theoretical  model  and  Section  VI 
describes  the  data.  Section  VII  presents  the  results  while  Section  VIII  develops  the 
policy questions and concludes.  
 
II.   Institutional Background 
 
The Colombian Institute of Family Welfare –ICBF - was founded in 1967. Its objective is 
to strengthen the processes of family development and integration, protect children and 
guarantee  their  rights.  To  protect  children  under  5  years  of  age  through  the 
improvement  of  their  nutritional  conditions,  the  ICBF  currently  operates  two  major 
modalities  of  child  care  –  the  HCB  and  the  Centro  de  Atención  Infantil  Preescolar 
(CAIP).  Benefit incidence estimates show that coverage
4 is low as a percentage of the 
objective population in both cases, but that the HCB modality is moderately progressive 
in its distribution as will be shown below.  CAIP, on the other hand, show significantly 
higher budget allocations, some evidence of better quality but are highly regressive in 
terms of the distribution of benefits (Fedesarrollo, 2000).   
 
ICBF’s main source of financing is a 3% payroll tax, which has been close to 0.6% of 
the GDP during the last few years. Other sources of income are ad hoc co-payment or 
parents or the community in which the services operate makes in-kind payments. In the 
past decade there was a shift inside ICBF away from the CAIP model and more towards 
the  HCB  mode.  This  has  implied  increased  resource  allocation  towards  HCB, 
amounting to approximately 40% of the ICBF budget in 2001-2.  
 
According to the Information System for Governance
5 (SIGOB for its name in Spanish), 
Hogares de Bienestar
6 covered 956.061 children in 2002, 952.016 in 2003 and 950.175 
                                                 
4 Defined as service use. 
5 This is an information system intended to improve the central government’s functioning through the 
monitoring  the  performance  and  goal  achievement,  as  well  as  improve  transparency  and  public 
monitoring.    6 
in June 2004. However, according to the ECV 2003, the ICBF coverage of the same 
programs  is  only  865.248
7.  The  discrepancy  between  the  figures  could  be  due  to 
several factors. For instance, ICBF coverage is calculated, for example, by multiplying 
the number of HCB by 15 (their maximum capacity). However, past studies suggest 
that, on average there are less than 14 children in each Hogar. The difference can also 
be due to particular characteristics of the ECV sample. 
 
Using the ECV information, 20% of the objective population currently attends some form 
of ICBF child care, which has traditionally been interpreted as a low coverage. However, 
as will be further discussed ahead, this might be an indication of family’s preferences of 
other  types  of  care  over  ICBF,  rather  than  unmet  demand.  Regarding  individual 
programs, it is difficult to find coverage data discriminated by program. However, the 
main tendencies regarding numbers have been preserved during the last few years. 
Table 3 presents some figures for 1998.  
 
Table 3. ICBF Interventions 






a)  Traditional:  
child care centers run by 
professional staff 
b)  Non-conventional: 
run by trained community 
personnel 
a)  Day care, supplemental feeding, health 
care  and  pre-school  education  for 
children under 7 
b)   Similar,  to  traditional  but  operates  in 










Day care center run by a 
“community mother”, with 
completed 9th grade who is 
given minor training in child care 
and nutrition by ICBF 
Distribute  “Bienestarina”  (80%  of  daily 
nutritional requirements), up to 15 children 
per hogar, heavily involves the community. 
Bulk  of  funds  come  from  ICBF,  and 
parents are required to pay monthly fee of 




Day care center headed by a 
professional educator, and 
supervised by “community 
mothers” and volunteer parents. 
Targets  children  between  2  and  5,  who 
have at least 1 parent with little or no labor 
attachment.  Heavy  community 
involvement.  120  children  divided  into  2 
groups that come every other day. 
4.607 
Source: Perotti (2000). * ICBF Data for 1998 
 
The problems faced by ICBF are manyfold: i) revenue shortage; ii) procyclical financing; 
iii)  inefficient  use  of  resources;  iv)  poor  targeting;  v)  inefficient  delivery  system;  vi) 
private sector without regulation and accreditation; and vii) poor contracting systems. 
 
Despite its drawbacks, there are high potential benefits of the programs operated by 
ICBF.  First,  given  that  malnutrition  and  health  problems  in  are  at  higher  risk  in 
developing countries, improving child nutrition is an investment in the country’s human 
capital. Second, the programs may foster personal development of a child through early 
stimulation,  generating  improved  academic  performance  in  the  future.  Third,  by 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 The category Hogares de Bienestar includes HCB, Hogares Infantiles, Lactantes and Kindergarten and 
Jardines Infantiles.  
7 ICBF includes HCB, CAIP, Jaridnes Infantiles and Comunitarios, as well as City of Bogotá Care.   7 
providing care, they free up valuable parental time that enables them to participate in 
the work force. Finally, ICBF programs provide an implicit subsidy to poor families via 
the nutrition component.  
 
III.  Colombian Literature Review  
 
There are several previous papers on ICBF, ranging from budgetary and organizational 
analyses, to effects on the beneficiaries. However, there is no disaggregated data. This 
has  circumscribed  the  aspects  analyzed  by  scholars  and  policy-makers.  In  addition, 
despite these efforts, particularly from within the ICBF, little is known about the impact 
of ICBF programs on the nutritional status and/or well-being of the objective population. 
This is partly due to information restrictions, since there had not been a database that 
contained the necessary information for both control and treatment groups.  
 
In 1997 the ICBF financed an evaluation of the Hogar Comunitario de Bienestar (HCB) 
program,  which  aimed  at  quantifying  the  impacts  on  users,  as  well  as  studying  the 
internal organization and structure. Their main results were: i) HCB are attaining their 
objectives regarding targeting and protecting the poor; ii) HCB do not fulfill ICBF quality 
standards; iii) Hogares have a limited impact on child welfare, measured via nutrition, 
psycho-social  development  and  health;  and  v)  child  history,  family  behavior  and 
household characteristics have greater impact on such indicators. 
 
Given the lack of a control group and econometric problems, the causality between the 
intervention  and  its  effects,  for  example  regarding  nutrition,  cannot  be  determined. 
Therefore, the study cannot be classified as an “impact” evaluation. 
 
Vergara (1999) addresses two main issues. First, the necessary steps in the reform 
process towards a National Family Welfare System.  Second, she studied the required 
elements  to  improve  the  quality  of  child  care  provided  by  the  institution.  This  was 
attained  by  designing  new  child  care  programs,  given  an  analysis  of  the  available 
modes,  to  improve  on  the  existing  alternatives  and  include  joint  management  and 
financing with regional levels. Her work was based on working sessions within ICBF.   
 
Perotti (2001) studies Colombian public spending on social protection. In addition to the 
characterization  of  the  trends  and  objectives  of  the  Colombia  program  supply,  the 
author suggests improvements to ensure effectiveness of social expenditure, such as 
enhanced targeting. Regarding child care he attempts a comparison between the two 
main ICBF programs, HCB and CAIP, based on secondary evidence on relative costs 
and usage. He concludes that HCB seem to have little impact on the psychological and 
cultural development of children in rural areas, and that both HCB and CAIP do not 
seem to have an important role in freeing up working time for mothers. His proposal, 
“based on (admittedly tentative) evidence” is that ICBF should move back to the CAIP 
model and away from HCB.  
 
Fedesarrollo (2001) performed an analysis of the ICBF geared towards the design and 
implementation  of  the  Colombian  “Safety  Net”,  to  ensure  appropriate  targeting, 
coverage and effectiveness. This included Institutional design, program description, cost 
structure, coverage and impacts. They find that given the weak information system, the   8 
cost  structure  cannot  be  established  for  each  ICBF  program.  HCB,  CAIP  and 
Restaurantes Escolares are the most significant programs, with HCB displaying the best 
targeting  towards  the  poor.  They  propose  to  use  Sisben  to  improve  targeting  and 
prioritize resource allocation, both in the HCB and CAIP. Another of their conclusions is 
that  “Perhaps  the  most  pressing  need  of  ICBF  child  care  programs  are  impact 
evaluations…  (The  programs)  should  adopt  the  recommendations  derived  from  the 
existing evaluations”.  
 
Currently,  several  evaluations  of  ICBF  programs  are  on  the  way.  First,  one  of  the 
original objectives of the Impact Evaluation of Familias en Acción
8, was to compare the 
effects  this  program  has  with  the  impact  of  Hogares  in  order  to  assess  which 
intervention  is  most  cost  effective  in  improving  child  well-being.  Hence,  the  hired 
evaluation Consortium was to produce a quantification and comparison of their impacts. 
However, given data problems and methodological issues, it was decided instead to 
perform an evaluation of HCB given the available data. Preliminary results suggest that 
exposure to Hogares significantly increases height per age. In addition, female labor 
supply seems to increase with the program. Second, as part of the institutionalization of 
impact  evaluation  as  a  decision  making  and  policy-design  tool,  there  will  be  an 
evaluation of HCB in order to generate needed information on which to improve the 
quality of service provided. It is expected that the evaluation will occur in 2005.  
 
Finally the present paper focuses on the effect of child care choice on the mother’s 
labor market participation. There are several new aspects to this work that should be 
high lighted. First, as opposed to the other evaluations, this one does not focus solely 
on  Hogares  but  rather  on  all  alternative  care  arrangements.  This  approach 
complements the other evaluations, by providing a broader view of the market to better 
understand the impacts of the interventions. Second, since the participation rate of the 
mothers  of  young  children  has  increased  dramatically,  it  is  important  to  focus 
specifically on this aspect to understand the decision-making process that has led to 
this behavior, and uncover the  potential effect public policies can  have in this area. 
Third, it uses extensively the information contained in the ECV2003, and the child care 
mode in particular that has seldom been used before. The three studies together will 
provide valuable information to determine the relative success of the intervention.  
 
IV.  Market Characterization  
 
In 2003 the National Statistics Department –DANE- collected the Quality of Life Survey -
ECV 2003- with national coverage. Its main objective was to measure the present socio-
economic characteristics of the Colombian population and to allow for a description and 
analysis of the social structure. Its design  follows the methodology  promoted by the 
World  Bank  and  IDB  through  the  MECOVI  initiative  for  this  type  of  surveys.  The 
sampling  is  probabilistic, stratified, uses conglomerates  and  several  stages,  and the 
                                                 
8 Familias en Acción is a welfare program aimed at the accumulation of human capital in rural Colombia. 
The program consists on cash transfers to poor families (Sisben 1) with children under 7 years of age, 
conditional on the fulfillment of health and education conditions. It started in 2001 as part of the program 
package designed by the Colombian government, together with the IDB and World Bank, to counteract 
the  negative  effects of  the  economic  contraction  on  the  human  capital  levels  of  the  most  vulnerable 
segments of the population.    9 
expected  estimation  error  is  under  5%  at  a  country  level.  The  sample  is  24.090 
households,  and  the  information  collection  was  conducted  between  March  and  July 
2003 through direct interview to all the members of the household of age 18 or older. 
 
In  addition  to  the  usual  household-level  information,  the  information  relevant  to  the 
present  study  includes  demographic  variables,  poverty,  literacy,  schooling,  labor 
market, social security and a module on child care for children under 5.  
 
The  information  on  which  to  base  either  the  debate  or  potential  policy  changes  is 
scarce, in spite of the availability of a detailed module on child care use and payments 
in the 1997 and 2003 versions of the ECV. There is little published on payments for 
child care services or factors affecting their demand. This fact is due to both an under-
utilization of the ECV information as well as the lack of supply-side information to fully 
characterize  providers,  especially  of  the  informal  mode.  In  particular,  there  is  no 
systematic  information  about  the  operators  in  the  market,  including  the  ICBF.  Such 
characterization  is  of  particular  importance  since  one  of  the  most  commonly  cited 
problems of child care in the international policy debate is low quality of care
%.  
 
Notice that the papers referenced in the previous section all deal with ICBF. There are 
no papers characterizing or studying the private providers in the child care market. This 
is because there is little information available on non-ICBF modalities beyond price and 
characteristics of the beneficiaries (which come from the different versions of the ECV). 
Therefore, to better understand the market, and to be able to match user information 
with supply data, a survey should be conducted among providers to be able to better 
characterize  the  situation.  This  is the  only  way to  generate  quality  data,  to  improve 
estimations and guide public policy decisions. 
 
 
i.  Use of child care services 
 
Given the nature of the main research questions, for most of the analyses the types of 
care  have  been  bundled  into  4  main  groups.  The  first  comprises  all  the  programs 
provided  by  ICBF,  including  HCB,  CAIP  and  City  of  Bogotá  services,  since  the 
institution finances it. Other centers includes other public and private institutions, Non-
parental  care  includes  baby-sitters,  friend  and  family.  Finally,  parental  care  includes 
children cared for by parents at home and at work
10. The first two will be considered 
formal care in our analysis while the latter two will be considered informal. Notice that 
this choice, driven by the survey’s design, implies that we are bundling together child 
care and pre-school: we’re not comparing pure-care options. An example of this is ICBF 
since we combine HCB with kindergartens such  as the  one provided  by the City  of 
Bogotá
11.  The  same  is  true  for  the  Center  category,  since  other  public  and  private 
kindergartens  are  included  and  it  is  impossible  to  discriminate  between  attendee  to 
                                                 
9 The only information regarding quality comes from an evaluation performed by the ICBF of their own 
programs in 1997. They find that HCB do not meet their own quality criteria. 
10 Since less than 2% of the children between 0-5 are taken care of by their parents at work, despite the 
inherent interest in this type of care arrangement, it is not possible to perform separate analysis. 
11 Bogotá publicly provided  child care represents only 1.5% of the total number of children  attending 
formal modes of care.   10 
either.  The  decision  was  made  to  keep  the  pre-school  options  to  avoid  introducing 
selection bias in latter estimation stages.  
 
Several key tendencies are apparent when studying the market demand characteristics. 
First, there has been an important growth in the Colombian market for child care, and a 
tendency towards formal types of care, as shown in Table 4
12. In 1997 a little over 18% 
of children used formal modes as their main type of care, whereas this figure doubled in 
2003. The increased usage of center-based care seems to correspond to the increase 
in the participation rate of females due to the 1997-9 recession, since there was clearly 
a substitution between parental and formal care. The main recipient of the additional 
children was ICBF, which covered 20.5% of the children in 2003 versus a 9.5% in 1997, 
stressing the increased relevance of the service.     
 
However, despite its growth and tendency towards formal modes of care, as well as the 
diversity in qualities and prices of the current supply (as will be partially reported below), 
the  child  care  market  remains  largely  informal.  In  2003  65%  of  the  children  attend 
informal modes of care. ￿
￿
￿
These levels of use of formal child care are comparable to countries like the USA. The 
United States’ child care market has expanded and has increasingly moved away from 
informal home-based care and toward formal arrangements. Blau (2001) reports that “in 
1994  about  two  thirds  of  child  care  took  place  at  home,  and  the  child  care  market 
remains  predominantly  home-based  to  this  day”
13.  Thus,  the  fact  that  the  market  is 
largely informal in Colombia does not necessarily suggest “unmet demand”. It can also 
be expressing preferences and/or opportunities from agents to use alternative modes of 
care; that is, families might prefer to leave child care to the mother or a close member of 
the  family  if  possible.  However,  given  the  increasing  tendency  in  the  female  labor 
                                                 
12 There are differences between the ECV 1997 and 2003 questionnaires. The data reported correspond 
to the arrangement used for the most hours during the day, or question 1 in both questionnaires. This is 
due to the fact that the emphasis of this paper is on the main child care arrangement. In ECV 1997 there 
was another question: Apart from this alternative, where else do you send your children? This secondary 
arrangement  will  add  to  the  reported  beneficiaries  of ICBF  an  extra  150.217 children,  and  to  Center 
81.871. This accounts for some of the difference with previous coverage estimations. Bear in mind, also, 
that this paper focuses on children less than 5 years old, whereas other research has chosen children 
between 0 and 7 years old. An example of this are calculation by Misión Social who find using ECV 1997 
that ICBF has 820.668 beneficiaries for the latter age group. Núñez and Lasso (forthcoming) report using 
ECV that there are 913 thousand children between 0 and 7 years old attending ICBF.  
13 Pg 21. 
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market participation, we could expect greater demand in the future. This point will be 
further developed later in this section. 
 
Since the type  of attention required by an infant or toddler is very  different that the 
treatment required by a 4-year-old, we study the difference in care usage across age 
groups. As expected for infants, the parental care use is very high: 85% (See Table 5). 
However, as children get older, the parental care is rapidly substituted for ICBF (2 and 3 
years  old)  and  Center  (3  and  4  years).    The  Non-Parental  mode  remains  relatively 
constant across child ages, displaying a slight decrease particularly at 4 years. Since 
the use of this type of care is highly dependent on the availability of a care provider 
(member  of  the  family,  friend  or  neighbor),  the  fact  that  it  remains  constant  might 
suggest restrictions in availability.￿
￿
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Table 6 shows the usage of formal modes of care by age groups. The most frequently used 
mode for infants and toddlers is HCB, which accounts for 64% of the children between 0 -2 
years. Also, 81% of the same age group attends some form of ICBF program. This implies that 
the services provided by this institution are crucial for this particular age group. However, at 
this point it is difficult to determine whether families choose ICBF because they consider the 
type  of  care  provided  as  appropriate,  for  example  due  to  the  nutrition  or  psycho-social 
component, or whether this might be signaling that freeing up the parent’s time to work is very 
important for such families.  
 
For the 3-4 age group, the number of children attending formal care more than doubles. The 
importance of other public institutions and private kindergartens increases, accounting for 50% 
of the children. The number of children that attend the two modes in the 3-4 group is similar, 
543,185 for ICBF and 519,599 for Center. The number of children attending ICBF increases   12 
70% comparing the two age groups, but for Centers the number of children between 3-4 years 
old is nearly 7 times more than of the 0 – 2 age group. One possible explanation is that poor 
families send their children to ICBF, due to restriction in access to other types of care, while 
better off families can afford to use parental care for longer time, to then turn to the private 
centers.  Hence,  when  analyzing  the  family’s  simultaneous  care  mode  and  labor  market 
participation decision, it is important to perform the analysis also by age groups. ￿
￿
Source: ECV 2003, author’s calculations 
￿
Regarding the gender patterns of service use, we see that in all the formal care modes 
we have a female participation between 52 and 53%. However, for the case of HCB 
57% the female share amount only to 43%. This is surprising, and hard to interpret.   
 
 
ii.  Targeting  
 
Before discussing care targeting, lets summarize what recent studies such as Velez 
(2002)  and  Santamaría  (2004)  have  concluded  about  the  evolution  of  poverty  in 
Colombia,:  i)  the  1997-9  economic  crisis  considerably  increased  the  poverty  levels, 
regardless of the way we measure poverty; ii) there is preliminary evidence that recent 
economic growth is positively affecting poverty; iii) poverty levels decreased in 2003 for 
every measure and every region; iv) the decrease in extreme poverty is greater than the 
decrease in poverty; v) poverty in rural areas has decreased more in urban ones; vi) 
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despite  increases  in  the  per  capita  income,  the  increase  in  inequality  did  not  allow 
poverty levels to drop faster. 
 
As  measured  by  average  per  capita  income,  poorer  families  choose  either  ICBF  or 
parental  care,  whereas  better  off  families  use  either  center  or  non-parental  modes 
(Table  7).  The  average  income  in  Center  care  is  over  twice  the  mean  for  ICBF  of 
parental modes.￿
￿
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According to the information contained in ECV 2003, Hogares’ beneficiaries have the 
lowest mean and median per capita income of all the formal modes, followed by Bogotá 
public  care  and  Guardería,  Hogar  Infantil  or  Kindergarten  (Figure  1).  The  average 
income of a family using a private pre-school or kindergarten is almost 4 times higher 
than HCB, and its standard deviation of is at least twice as high as the deviation each of 
the other categories. This might suggest that the wealthier choose private care.  
￿
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Taking a closer look at the ICBF programs, we confirm that many users belong to the 
lowest deciles of income distribution. However, as shown in Figure 2, only HCB has 
clearly progressive targeting. Hogares has the best targeting of the three programs, with 
a  right-tailed  distribution.  74%  of  its  users  belong  to  the  bottom  half  of  the  income 
distribution. Guardería, Hogar Infantil, Jardín focuses mostly on deciles 4-8 and Bogotá 
public care has a relatively flat coverage across deciles 1-7 and has a peak on the 8
th 
income decile.    14 
 
Núñez  and  Lasso  (forthcoming)  measure  the  progressivity  or  reggressivity  of  the 
Colombian public expenditure using Gini and concentration coefficients
14. They find that 
the most progressive subsidy is ICBF, with a concentration coefficient of –0.264. Within 
ICBF  programs,  the  one  with  the  best  targeting  in  HCB,  confirming  the  previous 
analysis. 
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According to the information from ECV 2003, 48% of HCB beneficiaries come from the 
lowest 3 income deciles. Calculations made by the Social Mission based on ECV 1997 
and reported by Fedesarrollo (2001) suggest that in that year, 42% of the HCB users 
came from the first three income deciles. Thus, the targeting of HCB seems to have 






Calculations of the average fees paid by care users in formal modes show that HCB 
charges the lowest fees, which are roughly half of those charged in the other ICBF 
modalities. Private care fees are almost 8 times higher than HCB. This implies that 
while HCB focalizes through geographic location and low prices. Hogares has attained 
very good targeting. However, other studies suggest that targeting outcomes have been 
achieved at the expense of quality of care (Fedesarrollo, 2001). On the other hand, 
private supply targets through price to the top income quintiles. Given this variation in 
prices,  a  key  matter  to  address  would  be  a  comparison  regarding  quality  of  care. 
However, as discussed earlier, this is not possible due to the lack of information. ￿
￿
                                                 
14 The first one grows between 0 and 1 where 1 mean maximum income concentration, while the second 
ranges between –1 and 1 with negative values denoting subsidy progressivity and positive the opposite. 
15 Fees are taken to be the sum of matrícula and pensión, and does not take into account other possible 
expenses incurred by the families, given the extremely low reports in the other categories.    15 
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The average monthly fee for HCB was $16.081 and for Guardería, Hogar Infantil or 
Jardín de Bienestar it was $38,037. According to Misión Social calculations using ECV 
1997, the fees were $3.590 for Hogares and $8.751 for CAIP
16. ICBF estimates suggest 
that on average HCB charged $2.548 and $2.955 for 1998 and 1999, respectively. The 
latter are somewhat lower than what calculations with both shifts of ECV suggest. 
 
When classifying paid monthly fees by a poverty measure, it is apparent that child care 
costs could potentially be a hurdle for low income families. Only 85% of the formal care 
users reported the actual fees paid. Those who did not report are concentrated in the 
first two income quintiles. Hence, it is impossible to ascertain whether they actually don’t 
pay or whether they just didn’t report. Thus, to see how important child care expenditure 
for families is across quintiles, we calculated fees as a percentage of the per capita 
income, both excluding and including those families who reported no expenditure. When 
including only strictly positive fees payment, for the first quintile paid fees correspond to 
55% of income, whereas for the other quintiles it ranges between 21 and 27% (Table 8). 
On absolute terms, the average fee paid by family from the second quintile is less than 
what the families from the first quintile pay. Also, notice that the fees paid by the top 
income quintile are over 4 times higher than the fees paid by the other groups. When 
considering all beneficiaries, the main trend is preserved: people from the first quintile 
still pay a significantly higher percentage of their income in care (35%), as compared to 
the rest of the families. Hence the cost of child care might be a hurdle, especially for 
very low income families.  
￿
                                                 
16 The differences may be driven by a methodological choice. Of those children who attend formal care, 
85% report paying strictly positive fees. Since it is impossible distinguish between those who do not pay 
and those who did not repot payment, the analysis presented was performed including only those families 
who reported fee payment. However, this excludes families that indeed don’t pay for formal child care; 
possibly many people from the low quintiles don’t pay and are excluded from the sample.    16 
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Since a big percentage of HCB’s beneficiary population belongs to the bottom income 
quintiles, we wanted to study whether their fees are regressive, despite the progressivity 
of the targeting. Additional calculations show that the fees paid by families from the first 
quintile  amount  to  0.23  of  their  per  capita  income.  Hence,  HCB’s  charged  fees  are 
progressive. What drives the surprising 55% from Table 8 is the fact that fees charged 
by City of Bogotá care and Private Pre-school or Kindergarten are roughly twice the per 
capita income (2.07 and 1.91, respectively). It is surprising that  City  of Bogotá care 
charges  quintile  1  beneficiaries  more  than  the  private  sector,  which  is  commonly 
perceived as serving the high end of the income distribution. To better understand the 
desegregated behavior of care providers regarding fees, Table 9. presents the mean 
monthly fees paid by income quintiles.  
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This desegregation shows that HCB, ICBF Kindergartens and other public pre-schools 
display a progressive fee structure. Private kindergartens seem to charge an extremely 
high fee to people from the first income quintile, but have otherwise a progressive scale. 
City  of  Bogotá  care  has  an  unexpected  structure,  since  the  amount  charged  varies 
across quintiles, charging the odd quintiles particularly high rates. The pricing behavior 
of Private kindergartens and City of Bogotá care are the driving forces behind the high 
share of per capita income paid by people in quintile 1 for child care. These calculations 
include only families who report positive fee payment. Also, since income is traditionally 
very  sensitive  to  misreporting,  these  results  must  be  interpreted  with  some  caution. 
However, they are a good indication of the tendency in fee payment.    17 
 
 
iv.  Quality 
 
As mentioned above, there is no information about the quality of child care offered in the 
market. In the ECV users are asked to state their perceptions regarding the quality of 
the services used. This is not a very good measure of the true quality, but it does reflect 
how parents perceive their choices. Table 10 shows that in general 92% of families 
consider their child care choices to be either good or very good.   
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However, there is some variation across alternatives. While 41% and 38% of families 
consider Bogotá publicly provided care and private institutions, respectively, to be very 
good, only 24% of parents state the same of HCB and 20% for other public jardín. This 
finding is in line with Fedesarrollo (2001): “HCB has attained very effective targeting 
strategies  and  community  participation.  However,  this  seems  to  have  been  attained 
partly at the expense of quality and a limited impact on the welfare of the beneficiaries.”   
 
v.  Labor Market Attachment and Education 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the increase in the participation rates of women with 
young children is one of the most prominent features of the modern labor markets. As 
shown in Table 11, both the participation and employment rates vary widely across child 
care modes. The highest rates correspond to families who use non-parental care, with 
90% and 87% participation and employment rates, respectively. The lowest figures, as 
expected,  correspond  to  families  choosing  the  parental  mode,  since  mothers  are   18 
frequently the care providers. In addition, notice that the participation and employment 
rates for center are significantly higher than for ICBF programs.  
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Figure 4 shows the educational attainment of mothers. ICBF services are used mostly 
by families whose mothers have completed Secondary or less. Center care use 
increases with educational attainment; even though it peaks at secondary education, it 
has the highest coverage for mothers with superior education. Non-Parental care has 
low usage, except for families where the mother completed secondary. Finally, Parental 
education has the highest frequency, except for highly educated mothers, who seem to 
prefer Center based care.  
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vi.  Restrictions to Access 
 
The questionnaire includes a question for those children using informal modalities of 
care, asking for the reason why they did not use formal care. The first three reasons (no 
institutions nearby, expensive and no slots) are directly related to constraints faced by 
families, who on the absence of such constraints potentially would have chosen formal 
care. The next three categories can be interpreted as expressing preferences. Figure 4   19 
shows that over half the children don’t attend because their families believe they’re not 
old enough yet. In general, if we accept the previous classification of constraints versus 
preferences,  then  21%  of  children seem  to  face  constraints,  whereas  73%  seem  to 
prefer not to use formal care. 
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Attanasio and Vera (forthcoming) study the reasons of non-attendance among the poor 
for the particular case of HCB (see Table 12). They find that for children between 0-1 
the main reason is the availability of a caregiver at home.  For the other age groups, this 
reason is no longer as strong. As children get older, the availability of care provider at 
home decreases its importance and other factors become more prominent. In particular, 
non listed reasons captured by “other” explain half of the non- attendance to Hogares. 
However,  the  lack  of  a  nearby  Hogar  affects  roughly  one  fifth  of  children,  which 
suggests that this is an important constraint.  
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When analyzing the restrictions faced by families from different income levels, we see 
from Table 13. that across the lowest SISBEN levels, the main difference is given by the 
lack of institutions nearby; 28% of those in Sisben 1 feel that is the main reason, whereas 
only 17% and 12% of families Sisben 2 and 3 feel constrained by that, respectively.  On 
the other hand, a smaller percentage of people from Sisben 1 feel it is very expensive 
than people from the other portrayed levels, which is surprising. Again, about half of the   20 
children don’t assist because they’re not old enough yet. 36% of Sisben 1 and 29% of 
Sisben 2 are constrained.  
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￿"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 8,033 16,459 24,492
3% 3% 3%
￿8￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿,￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ 26,556 76,448 103,004
10% 13% 12%
%￿ .￿￿ * .￿ .7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ D￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2
￿ ￿.E ￿ ￿ ￿ 4,047 41,055 45,102
2% 7% 5%
&￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ 128,901 273,574 402,475
49% 46% 47%
5￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 8,151 30,629 38,780
3% 5% 5%
"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 261,863 591,850 853,713
100% 100% 100%
%￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
When examining the main reasons for not attending formal care by per capita income 
quintiles (Table 14), the first striking result is that how expensive care is increases in 
importance to 11 and 7% for quintiles 1 and 2, respectively. Lack of institutions nearby 
sharply decreases its relevance as a constraint for families, being around 15 for the first 
two quintiles. Finally, 29% of quintile 1 and 24% of quintile 2 are constrained.   
 
The analysis of restrictions versus preferences by measures of poverty suggests that the 
degree of informality of the market for child care greatly reflects the preferences of the 
families. However, the restrictions seem to affect the poor to a greater extent. The fact 
that a quarter of those considered poor (Sisben 1 and 2) feel constrained suggests that 
despite  the  government’s  efforts  to  provide  affordable  care,  and  the  good  targeting 
displayed  by  ICBF  programs,  further  efforts  should  be  exerted  to  try  to  reach  those 
vulnerable families that are still constrained by the lack of child care. 
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￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿)$ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1 2 Total
"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 * 138,959 88,460 227,419
16% 13% 15%
# ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ * ￿￿ B 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ 93,920 44,331 138,251
11% 7% 9%
￿"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 17,701 25,952 43,653
2% 4% 3%
￿C￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿,￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ 106,237 86,666 192,903
12% 13% 13%
%￿ .￿￿ * .￿ .7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ D￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2
￿ ￿.E ￿ ￿ ￿ 45,592 59,199 104,791
5% 9% 7%
/￿ @ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ 402,894 343,401 746,295
47% 51% 49%
5￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 46,088 24,903 70,991
5% 4% 5%
"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 851,391 672,912 1,524,303
100% 100% 100%
%￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿
 
V.  Model 
 
Following Blau and Hagy (1998) we develop and estimate a model that analyzes the 
mother’s employment decision, the demand for quality in child care, the decision to pay 
for care and mode choice. However, unlike the referenced paper, we will not estimate 
the  demand  for  quality  of  child  care.  This  is  due  to  the  described  lack  of  data, 
particularly for private and informal providers. Therefore, we need to account for the 
omitted decision in the estimation, as will be described shortly.  
 
To make the model tractable, we’ll assume that the employment decisions of family 
members other than the mother are taken as given. The household utility function is: 
￿
A￿F￿A￿< ￿G￿ ￿1￿ ￿$￿ ￿# H ￿I￿ ￿h￿> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ J  K ￿
￿
Where is L is leisure, G consumption of goods and the state I, X is a vector of observed 
exogenous variables and h captures unobserved preferences. Note that the utility is 
state  dependent.  The  state  is  a  categorical  variable,  defined  as  combinations  of 
employments status, payment status and mode (i.e: employed mother, pays for child   22 
care,  uses  center  care).    There  are  14  states,  cross-classifying  the  4  modes
17
,  2 
employment states and 2 child care expenditure states. 
￿
The budget constraint is given by: 
￿
1￿L￿￿￿F￿1￿L￿%￿￿￿ ￿F￿M/￿L￿C￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ J ￿K ￿
￿
E is expenditure in child care,￿￿￿￿ ￿price of an hour of non-parental care in state i and 
market l,  W the mother’s hourly wage rate, H the hours worked and Y the non-labor 
income (which includes the income from other household members).  Notice that we 
can’t use a quality-adjusted measure, as suggested by Blau and Hagy. The limitations 
proposed by this fact are discussed ahead.￿￿
￿
The mother and child’s time constraints: 
￿
/￿L￿G￿L￿"￿F￿%￿L￿"￿F￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ J ￿K ￿
￿
The household optimizes their decision problem and by substituting the mother’s labor 
supply, demand for child care and goods into the utility function we can obtain the state-
specific indirect utility function. The state yielding the highest utility is optimal (very a la 
McFadden). We specify a linear approximation to the indirect utility for each state: 
￿
￿￿￿￿￿F￿￿￿Ib￿￿L￿￿￿￿￿ ￿a￿ ￿￿L￿Ma￿￿￿￿￿L￿e￿￿￿ ￿F ￿ N ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ J ￿K ￿
￿
Where  V  is  utility  and  X  observed  exogenous  variables,  including  now  non-labor 
income.  
￿
Also, we estimate a linear specification of the probability that the household chooses 
state i.  
￿
(￿ < ￿> ￿F￿￿(￿ ￿< ￿￿￿O￿￿?￿"?¹￿> ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿F￿(￿ J e￿￿’￿e￿￿O￿I< b￿￿’￿b?￿> ￿L￿< ￿￿?￿ ￿a￿ ?￿L￿Ma￿￿?￿> ￿P￿< ￿￿￿￿ ￿a￿ ￿￿L￿Ma￿￿￿￿> ￿"?¹￿K ￿￿￿ J ￿K ￿￿
￿
Under the independent extreme value assumption, we use the multinomial logit and 
thus: 
￿
(￿ < ￿> ￿F￿￿
4  ￿E ￿Q?￿￿
4 ?￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ J ￿@ K ￿
￿
Finally, we approximate the available choices: 
￿
CD￿F￿g￿￿D￿L￿IgD￿L￿￿￿ ￿R ￿ ￿L￿M￿R ￿￿￿L￿SD￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿DF ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿T￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿￿F￿ ￿ ￿N ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ J ￿K ￿
￿
Where CD￿is the vector of choice variables (ie: care mode, etc) and SD￿is a disturbance 
with mean zero. K is the number of relevant choice variables.  
                                                 
17  ICBF  comprises  all  the  programs  provided  by  this  institution,  Formal  included  public  and  private 
institutions, Informal care includes baby-sitters, friend and family.   23 
￿
The model is based on a restrictive assumption regarding the availability of alternatives 
to families. In particular, each family’s choice set must include arrangements with all 
possible combinations of choice variables, i.e. employment, mode and payment status. 
If the assumption holds, then the observed distribution of choices can be interpreted as 
outcomes  of  parental  decisions.  If  it  doesn’t,  the  generated  results  are  a  useful 
description of joint distributions, but are not evidence of consumer behavior.  
 
Given  the  previous  analysis  of  constraints  faced  by  care  users,  it  is  reasonable  to 
believe  that  most  agents  have  access  to  arrangements  in  any  of  the  states.  An 
exception could be low income families, as mentioned earlier. About one quarter of poor 
families are constrained in their use of child care, as suggested by Tables 13 and 14.  
Thus, results for poor families should be interpreted more as a description of the current 
situation rather than as a free decision on behalf of the agents. 
 
VI.  Data  
 
From the ECV 2003 we chose families in which the youngest member was less than 5 
years  old,  which  account  for  30%  of  Colombian  families  (3,373,761  families).  Over 
78.4% of the households with children have only one child, 18.3% have two and the 
remaining 3.3% is split between 3 and 5 children with less than 5 years of age. Despite 
the availability of information on child care practices for all children in the household, the 
analysis will focus on the care arrangements for the youngest child in the household. 
This  is  because  the  youngest  child  represents  the  most  stringent  constraint  in  the 
family’s  decision,  since  it  requires  closer  attention.  Also,  given  the  existing  scale 
economies in the child care market, most families choose the same care mode for all 
their children in the relevant age group. However, there is still a portion of families that 
choose different arrangements for children (especially when there are different mother 
for the children). In those cases, we have a problem of cell size: to capture the effect of 
different care modes  chosen in the same  household,  we need to  expand  our mode 
alternatives into smaller cells to allow for more alternatives. Hence, we chose to focus 
on the care arrangements for the youngest child.  
 
Many similar studies for other countries estimate the demand for quality in the child care 
market, as measured for example by the ration of children and care providers, or the 
educational level of care providers. This information usually comes from special surveys 
aimed directly at characterizing the supply for child care. However, for the Colombian 
case there is no information on the proxies of quality of child care. This implies that the 
present analysis does not include any quality-related aspects. As will be discussed later, 
posterior  stages  of  the  analysis  should  deal  with  the  issue  and  try  to  estimate  the 
distribution of quality related attributes econometrically. The lack of quality information 
limits the ability to interpret the results since, for instance, when modeling the decision 
for child care mode, we would like to control for their quality. Also, it would be interesting 
to estimate the willingness to pay for quality, to determine the potential fee structure to 
accompany an increase in quality of publicly provided care.  
 
An  additional  issue  is  that  there  is  no  information  on  hours  of  care,  since  the 
questionnaire does not include the question. One alternative was to approximate hours   24 
of  care  by  hours  worked  by  the  mother,  plus  transportation  time  to  and  from  work. 
However, data for this is only available for working mothers, which is less that half our 
sample given that we’re interested in modeling the mother’s working decision. Hence, 
hours of care were not included in the estimations. This implies that we couldn’t exploit 
the amount paid for care per family since; by not controlling for hours or quality; family’s 
expenditures  on  care  are  not  comparable  in  a  strict  sense.  This  implies  that  some 
interesting questions, such as the price elasticity of care mode or employment cannot 
be  calculated.  This  restricts  the  possibility  of  performing  simulations  of  changes  in 
prices on the probability of choices.  
 
From the ECV2003, household in which the youngest child is less than 5 years old were 
selected.  We  eliminated  observations  with  missing  data  in  any  of  the  dependent 
variables.  Table  15  shows  the  Frequency  Distributions  of  the  Discrete  Outcomes, 
characterizing the sample. 
￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿/￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ) $￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1$￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
9￿ ￿ < ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ = ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿
# ￿$% 135,165 ￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 154,556   ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
&￿ ￿ ’(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 576 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
# ￿$% 13,544  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 844 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
&￿ ￿ ’(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 123,036 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 228,206  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
# ￿$% 113,140 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 92,085 ￿￿￿￿ ￿!￿￿￿
&￿ ￿ ’(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 43 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
# ￿$% 13,437  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
&￿ ￿ ’(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 13,838  ￿￿￿  ￿￿ ￿
(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 511,786 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
*￿ ￿(￿ ￿ )$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿
9￿￿ ￿9￿ ￿ <
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿
9￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ $￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
# ￿$% ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ 275,286  ￿￿!￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿!￿ 247,485  !￿!￿
&￿ ￿ ’(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 137,493 ￿￿￿￿
(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 739,992 ￿￿￿￿￿









When the first two care modes are chosen, there are a high percentage of mothers 
working. However, for the case of non-parental care, the highest percentage of mothers 
is employed: 89.9%.  Obviously, when parental care is chosen, a small percentage is   25 
employed since almost by definition they are themselves the care providers. Notice that 
if  paid  care  is  chosen,  then  families  choose  between  ICBF  and  Center.  Since  by 
definition families don’t pay for Parental care, and the sample information suggests they 
don’t pay for Non-Parental either, the when choosing to pay for care they choose formal 
care. This is going to drive some results in the estimation of this decision.  
 
Table 16 describes the dependent variables. The omitted categories of the categorical 
variables were chosen to be the most prevalent group, to have a good and significant 
counterfactual to compare our results.  
￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿0 ￿ ￿￿> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿7￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ +￿?￿￿￿ !--￿ ￿￿0 ￿
7￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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The mother’s wage rate is the average hourly earnings per pay period. This information 
is only available for employed mothers. Hence, we need to generate a wage rate for 
non-employed mothers to estimate the discrete part of the model. To do this, we predict 
a wage rate for non-employed mothers from a standard wage equation, corrected for 
sample selection (see details of estimation in Annex 1). The non-wage income is the 
total household income minus the mother’s labor income.  
￿
In all the estimations we control for whether the family lives in a rural or urban area as 
well  as  the  region  in  within  the  country.  These  variables  may  be  associated  with 
availability of alternative modes of care as well as parental preferences.  
 
VII.  Estimation and Results 
 
The estimation will be carried out by stages, due to the level of complexity. The first 
stages will provide intuition as to how Colombian families make decisions. Latter stages 
will be carried out at a posterior date, remaining econometric problems will be solved,   26 
and more sophisticated techniques will be employed to try to characterize the quality of 
the  different  care  modes  by  estimating  its  distribution.  Given  the  amount  of  work 
required to address the full estimation strategy and the data restrictions, the present 
study will focus on the first estimation stages providing a clear picture of the driving 
forces behind family decisions, and the effect of the main variables. This will set the 
ground for more elaborate future analysis. 
 
i. Estimation of Individual Equations 
 
There are several decisions of interest regarding the problem at hand, as mentioned 
earlier.  The  first  stage  in  the  estimation  is  to  get  an  idea  as  to  what  variables  are 
significant  when  modeling  the  decisions.  Hence,  despite  potential  endogeneity 
problems, we first estimate the decisions individually. 
  
A. Work Decision 
 
The decision to participate in the labor market depends on individual characteristics, as 
developed in the model. Mothers make a marginal cost-benefit analysis of the impact on 
earnings of working versus the entailed costs of devoting a significant number of hours 
to work outside the home, given the presence of young children. The working decision 
can be seen  as  a  dichotomous  random variable taking the value of 1 if the mother 
Works and 0 if she doesn’t. The marginal benefit is assumed to depend linearly on 
individual  characteristics.  Thus,  the  problem  boils  down  to  finding  the  probability  of 
occurrence  of  these  two  events  conditional  on  observed  individual  characteristics. 
Assuming  that  the  random  variable  follows  a  logistic  cumulative  distribution,  we 
maximize  the  likelihood  that  the  sample  is  generated  by  the  distribution  and  hence 
calculate the parameters using a logit specification. Namely,￿
￿
G￿ - ￿￿ ￿< 6 > ￿F￿￿ ￿ - ￿< 6 ￿E ￿<  ’6 > > ￿F￿a￿L￿b￿I@ ￿L￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ J !K ￿
￿
The variables included in the X vector are: chosen child care mode and whether the 
family  pays  for  care  (since  these  aspects  are  key  to  the  focus  of  the  paper).  The 
mother’s wage  is included to  capture  the  marginal  benefit  of working.  Variables  like 
education, age and age squared are included to account for the effect of skills and work 
experience.  Other included variables are Non-Wage income, Child’s age, Number of 
children younger than 5, other than the youngest and Marital status.  
 
Estimations were made both for the whole sample, and also only for those who belong 
to the lowest income quintile, to see the differences in impact the variables have on the 
poor. The results are presented in Table 17. The coefficient from the logit estimations 
cannot be directly interpreted as in the case of OLS. Hence, the marginal effects are 
also reported, to better compare results
18. The marginals tell us how the probability of 
an event changes as X changes: 
￿
                                                 
18 In the following sections only the marginal effects will be discussed, given that they allow for a direct 
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￿
Since many of the included explanatory variables are dummies, and hence there is an 
excluded category, the coefficients are interpreted in the usual way: the additional effect 
with respect to the excluded category. Also, the marginal for dummies is evaluated at 
the point where the variable makes the discrete change from 0 to 1.  
￿
￿Results in Table 17 show that with respect to parental care (the excluded category), the 
use of other modes increases significantly the probability of mother’s employment. The 
use of ICBF, Center and Non-Parental increases the probability of being employed by 
20%, 23% and 50%, respectively. This was to be expected, since frequently mothers 
are the care providers. However, there is an interesting pattern in the differences of 
contribution to the probability of employment. The use of formal modes has an important 
effect,  but  Non-Parental’s  effect  is  twice  that  of  the  others.  This  implies  that  the 
availability of a care provider in the family is what most increases the probability of the 
mother working. For low-income families, the same trend is preserved. However, the 
magnitude of the effects is much higher. Again with respect to Parental care, the use of 
ICBF,  Center  and  Non-Parental  significantly  increases  the  probability  of  the  mother 
being employed by 33%, 45% and 69%, respectively. Since the impact of the availability 
of choices on the employment status of the mother is much higher in poor families, 
especial  emphasis  should  be  put  in the pertinent  public policies to  ensure that  low-
income families can attain their potential by removing the child care obstacle.  
 
The wage displays a negative and significant impact on both estimations. We would 
expect this variable to have the opposite sign. A possible explanation is that since we 
are  already  controlling  for  household  income  and  capturing  the  income  effect,  the 
negative sign on wage might be capturing the substitution effect. The decision to pay for 
care  increases  the  probability  of  employment  by  3%  for  the  whole  sample,  and  it 
decreases it by 20% for the families who belong to the first quintile. Neither of these 
coefficients is significant at traditional levels of confidence. This might be due to the fact 
that the number of families from the first quintile who pay is very little and hence there is 
not enough variation.￿
￿
The  probability  of  employment  for  the  whole  sample  decreases  with  all  educational 
levels,  except  for  Superior  and  Superior  without  title,  with  respect  to  women  with 
secondary education. This implies that the more educated the women, the more likely it 
is that they are employed. For the case of low-income families, all the marginal effects 
of education are negative: as compared to women with secondary, having any other 
educational  level  decreases  the  probability  of  being  employed.  Marital  Status  is 
important in the decision to work for the whole sample (except for Married), relative to 
living together, but it looses its statistical significance when restricting the sample to low-
income families.￿
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Similar exercises were performed for different age groups of the youngest child, since 
the effect on the labor market participation decision of the mother might differs greatly 
depending  on  this  variable  (see  Annex  2).  The  results  suggest  that  with  respect  to 
Parental mode, the use of ICBF, Center and Non-Parental increases the probability of 
female employment 15%, 31% and 56% respectively for children between 0-1 and for 
children between 2-4 years the effects are 33%, 33% and 45%, respectively. Hence, for 
very young children the availability of an alternative care provider is key to mother’s 
employment,  whereas  as  children  grow, the impact  of  formal  care modes  increases 
significantly, and the effect of Non-Parental care decreases.  Thus, as children age, 
formal modes such as ICBF and Center become more important.  
 
 
B. Decision to Pay for Care 
 
When estimating the logit model for the decision to pay for care, the variables included 
in the X vector are Child care Mode, whether the mother works, Wage, Education, Non-
Wage Income, number of Children, Number of Adults in the Household, Sisben level, 
Marital  Status,  Zone,  Region  and  an  interaction  between  number  of  children  in  the 
household and marital status to capture the structure of the household.  Results are 
shown in Table 18.  
￿
￿
Very few variables appear significant on this estimation, but the results are very close to 
what  intuition  suggests.  The  effects  of  child  care  mode  are  as  expected.  Since  the 
control group is Parental care, the probability of paying for care increases by 100% if 
formal modes of care are chosen. The number of children younger than 5 decreases by 
2%  the  probability  of  choosing  to  pay  for  care.  Regarding  Marital  Status,  the  only 
category, which appears statistically significant, is Married. When compared to Living 
Together, being Married increases by 5% the probability of paying for care. This might 
be suggesting further income pooling when parents are married than when they choose 
other family arrangements. Finally, the interaction term is frequently significant and has 
a small negative effect on the decision to pay for care. 
 
Surprisingly,  whether  the  mother  works,  her  wage  and  non-wage  income  are  not 
significant. Finally, the Pseudo-R
2 is quite high. 
 
￿  30 
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿6 ￿ ￿4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
7￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
# ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 6￿ ’!￿!￿ ￿￿￿ 
# ￿$%  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ***  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ***  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
&￿￿’(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿   ￿￿ ! ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
M ￿￿ D￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
G￿- ￿/￿￿￿ ￿ * ￿M ￿ - ￿ ’￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
￿0￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿ 0￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿(￿ ￿.￿ ￿ * ￿# ￿￿ ￿.6￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿(￿ ￿.￿ ￿ * ’ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ** ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿0￿ * ￿# ￿￿ ￿.6￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿,￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ’ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
&￿￿’M ￿ - ￿ ￿# ￿￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
&￿.7￿ ￿ ￿￿2 ￿￿ ￿￿￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ *** ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿
&￿.7￿ ￿ ￿￿2 ￿￿ 0￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ 7￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿G￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿  ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿G￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿G￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’ ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿G￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿G￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿ 
;￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿;￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 0  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ * ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿M ￿0￿,￿ 0 ￿￿!￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿8￿4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
+￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ** ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
+￿ - ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ** ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿+￿ - ￿￿￿ ’￿￿!  ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2 2 ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ - ￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿’M ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿+￿ - ￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ *** ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿)￿￿￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ** ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿0￿ W ￿ ￿￿ ￿0￿(￿ ￿4 ￿0￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿ 
# ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿< ￿￿.7￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ 0￿ ￿ ￿X.￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ >
  ’￿￿ ! ￿￿￿￿ *** ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ’!￿￿! ￿￿ ￿ *** ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ** ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿! *** ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ’￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
 ￿ ’￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
 ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ .6￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿Y ￿  ￿ ￿￿!￿ ￿￿  * ￿F￿(￿ < 6￿ * > ￿F￿￿￿￿￿ 
(￿ ￿ ￿0￿￿+￿ ￿￿￿￿
&￿￿ ￿ ￿Z ￿ ￿￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0￿￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿0￿ 6￿ ￿0￿ ￿￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 7￿ ￿ ￿
&￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿X￿￿ ￿- ￿￿2 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿XX￿￿￿￿￿ ￿XXX￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿C￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ B￿
￿
￿  31 
 
 
C. Child Care Mode 
  
Since there is not a natural ordering of the child care modes, the selected estimation 
procedure is multinomial logit. The multinomial logit model is defined as the model 



















As usual with this model, we can only identify the difference in these parameters. We 
need to choose some category as the “base” group and standardize the coefficients for 
that group to be zero, to attain identification. In this case the default option is Parental 
Care since it is the most prevalent category. This implies that the presented results in 
Table  19,  which  are  Relative  Risk  Ratios  –RRR-  in  should  be  read  as  the 
increase/decrease in probability with respect to this base category, that is, the relative 
probability of alternative x with respect to the parental care is the relative risk ratio for a 
one unit change in the corresponding variable
19.  
 
The variables included in the X vector are: Decision to Work, Decision to Pay, Wage, 
Education,  Non-Wage  Income,  Child’s  Age,  Number  of  Children,  Number  of  Adults, 
Sisben level and Marital Status. In the present section we are interested in knowing how 
the decision to work, pay, education, race and marital status affect the probability of 
choosing one child care mode relative to the others.  
 
The decision to pay or not, despite being included in the estimation, is not reported. The 
estimated marginal effects are extremely high, due to the fact that once the families 
choose to pay for care, the probability of attending parental care, the comparison group, 
are close to zero. Hence, since when families don’t pay for care children attend informal 
modes, the effect on the probability of attendance to ICBF or Center when the family 
decides to pay is very high. 
 
Regarding  the  decision  to  work,  working significantly increases  the  risk using  ICBF, 
Center and Non-Parental as compared to Parental Care. However, it increases the risk 
of using Non-Parental care relative to the risk of using the formal care modes. This is 
very  important  since  it  stresses  the  relationship  between  the  work  decision  and  the 
choice of care mode. This is also suggestive of preferences, since mothers who choose 
to  work  want  someone  close  to  them  (Non-Parental)  to  take  care  of  their  children, 
especially for toddlers despite the availability of formal modes.￿￿
                                                 
19 RRR in multinomial logit should be interpreted as odds ratios are for logit. 
J ￿K ￿  32 
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿%￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿$￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿C￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
M￿ ￿ D  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ X ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ X  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ! XXX
G￿ - ￿/￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿M￿ - ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ X ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX
￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿&￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿(￿ ￿.￿ ￿ * ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ .6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿   ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX
￿￿￿￿￿(￿ ￿.￿ ￿ * ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ XX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ XX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  XXX
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ * ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ .6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ X ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿,￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿
&￿ ￿ ’M￿ - ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿   ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  XX
￿￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿- ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XX  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ XXX  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XX
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XX
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ XXX ￿￿￿!￿  ￿￿  XXX  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
&￿ .7 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ XXX  ￿￿! ￿￿￿ 
&￿ .7 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿  XX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ 7 ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿G￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿  ￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿G￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿   ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  XXX
￿￿￿￿￿G￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿!￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿   ￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿G￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  XX
￿￿￿￿￿G￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿   ￿!￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
;￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿;￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿  XXX
￿￿￿￿￿M￿0 ￿ ,￿ 0 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ XXX
￿￿￿￿￿8￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿  ￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ XXX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ XXX ￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX
+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ X  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  XX
+￿ - ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿ ￿ XXX ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! XXX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  X
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ - ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿!  ￿￿￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2 2 ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ - ￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ XX  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  XXX
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’M￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ - ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿!￿￿   ￿￿￿ XXX ￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿￿  ￿!! ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ XXX   ￿   ￿￿￿￿ XX ￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 0 ￿ W ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿(￿ ￿ 4 ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿  ￿!￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿   ￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ .6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿Y ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Z￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿+￿￿ D￿+￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿’￿￿￿ .6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿ 6 ￿(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿+￿ ￿￿￿￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿X￿￿ ￿- ￿ ￿2 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿XX￿￿￿￿￿ ￿XXX￿￿￿￿
￿" ￿*(￿, ￿￿￿￿B￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿￿￿￿B￿ +￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ , ￿￿￿B
￿
As  the  mother’s  wage  increases,  the  relative  risk  of  using  all  other  care  modes 
increases, especially formal ones. Non-Wage income is only important for the use of 
Non-Parental care; the risk of using non-parental vs. parental increases by 128% for a 
one-unit  change  in  the  non-wage  income.  Education  does  not  seem  to  affect 
significantly child care choice, except for Non-Parental mode. In this case, the risk of 
choosing  Non-Parental  as  compared  to  Parental  increases  for  low  educational 
categories relative to Secondary education. That is, in households where the mother 
has low educational attainment, it is very likely that they choose No-Parental care.   33 
 
The age of the youngest child is only significant for Center Care. As the child gets older, 
the relative risk of using Center care versus Parental increase; when children turn 4 
years old, the “risk” of using for Center Care increases by over six thousand percent. 
Give the inability to differentiate pure child care from pre-school, this might be capturing 
the  normal  age  at  which  children  are  first  sent  to  pre-school.  Also,  the  number  of 
children in the household has a significant impact on attendance of formal care modes 
as compared to Parental care. 
 
The number of adults in the household is only significant for the choice of Center care, 
but not for Non-Parental care. In addition, our measure of structural poverty does not 
seem  to  affect  significantly  the  mode  decision,  except  for  some  categories  in  Non-
Parental care. Regarding Marital Status, only being single is consistently important and 
increases the relative risk of using other forms of care versus Parental, in particular 
formal ones. For the case of Non-Parental, relative to living together, all other marital 
Status categories increase the relative risk of using Non-Parental when compared to 
Parental,  particularly  Widowed.  Again  the  overall  significance  of  the  estimation,  as 
measured by the Pseudo- R
2 is high. 
 
Summarizing, child care arrangements other than Parental seem to be complementary 
to  being  employed,  since  the  use  of  such  services  is  closely  related  to  mother’s 
employment,  particularly  Non-Parental.  Educational  level  has  an  important  effect  on 
whether the mother works, but not in the other modeled decisions. The Child’s Age is 
important only for the choice of Center mode as compared to Parental care, and has no 
significant  influence  on  the  use  of  other  modes  or  on  the  decision  to  pay  for  care. 
Marital Status significantly affects the decision to work for the whole sample (and not for 
the low-income families), the decision to pay for care in the case of Married couples as 
compared to the base category, and the choice of Non-Parental mode as compared to 
Parental care. Non-Wage income is only important in the decision to work for the whole 
sample. The level of structural poverty as measured by Sisben doesn’t appear to be 
significant in the decisions to pay for care or in the mode choice.  
 
ii. System of Equations  
 
We use Three-Stage  Least Squares (3SLS) to estimate the system of simultaneous 
equations
20. This approach provides a first look at the simultaneous decision and should 
be considered as suggestive of the main tendencies. Since the child care mode variable 
had  4  different outcomes,  this type  of estimation  does  not  capture  the  effect  of the 
independent  variables  on  each  mode.  Care  mode  was  reduced  to  two  categories: 
formal and informal. Thus, results should be read in terms of this new categorization, 
                                                 
20  This  is  equivalent  to  apply  the  liner  probability  model  to  the  decisions,  which  is  not  as  good  an 
approximation  as  the  logits  used  in  the  previous  section  fro  three  main  reasons:  i)  the  predicted 
probabilities can be greater than one or less than zero; ii) the marginal effects are constant throughout the 
range of the variables and the reported coefficients are already the marginal effects; and iii) it may be is 
heteroskedastic. The third problem directly conflicts with one of the assumptions behind 3SLS; since it is 
a special case of multiple-equation GMM, it requires the assumption of conditional homoskedasticity. 
However, given that the main trends of the individual equation estimations are preserved under 3SLS, the 
expected bias in the coefficients is small.    34 
and are presented in Table 20. Note that to achieve identification some assumptions 
about exclusions are necessary, as will be evident from the results. 
 
The working decision estimation behaves in a similar manner to the previous estimation, 
both  in  the  signs  of  the  coefficients  and  their  magnitude:  education  is  statistically 
significant, and as compared to the base category (Secondary), lower educational levels 
decrease the probability of being employed while higher schooling attainment increases 
it. The wage variable again has a negative coefficient, and hence the same explanation 
provided in the individual estimation of work decision applies here. Age, Age Squared 
and Non-Wage Income are again highly significant, and have very similar coefficients. 
Child’s Age now becomes significant in the decision to work. As compared to children 
with  less  than  1  year,  as  children  get  older  the  probability  that  the  mother  works 
increases, especially when the child reaches 4 years of age, which is consistent with 
previous results. 
￿
When choosing whether to pay for care and care mode, the work decision looses its 
significance.  Otherwise, the results are very similar to what was described in previous 
sections.  One  interesting  difference,  however,  is  the  fact  that  our  structural  poverty 
measure is significant in both. Belonging to Sisben levels 1 and 2, when compared to 
the base category Sisben 3, decreases the probability of paying for care but increases 
the  probability  of  choosing  formal  care  (as  opposed  to  informal).  These  finding  are 
interesting, since the first suggests that the poor have a lower probability of paying for 
care and hence care costs might be a hurdle for these families. The second, that the 
poorest  families  have  a  higher  probability  to  choose  formal  modes  of  care  than  an 
intermediate level, might  be indicative of the important role played by ICBF for low-
income families. 
 
Finally,  Marital  Status  has  some  relevance  for  the  Pay  and  Mode  decisions;  when 
comparing to  Living Together, being Divorced  or Single decreases the probability of 
paying for care and at the same time increases he probability of using formal care. This 
is reasonable since these are the categories where there is no income pooling with the 
partner and is likely to be a single parent home.￿  35 
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A key thing to note here is that, given that we have abstracted the demand for quality 
from  the  analysis  due  to  the  lack  of  information,  there  is  an  inherent  element  of 
heterogeneity that is not captured in the estimations. The differences in quality should 
be accounted for in later stages, as will be described in the following section. By not   36 
including the demand for quality we’re making the simplifying assumption that there are 
no  observable quality differences  in  child  care  across  alternatives  and  families  who 
choose paid care consume a fixed amount of time (all the difference is given in prices). 
This is not the most desirable assumption, but it is the best we can do given the data 
restrictions.   
 
VIII.  Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper uses recent Colombian data to perform a characterization of the child care 
market. We find that despite its growth and tendency towards formal modes of care, the 
child  care  market  remains  largely  informal.  There  are  differential  patterns  of  usage 
across  the  income  distribution:  poorer  families choose  either  ICBF or  parental  care, 
whereas better off ones use either center or non-parental. HCB, provided by ICBF, has 
both the most progressive focalization and the lowest average fees paid by care users 
in formal modes. Thus, it plays a very important social role. However, such attributes 
seem to have been attained partly at the expense of quality. Regarding mother’s labor 
market  engagement,  both  the  participation  and  employment  rates  of  the  mothers  of 
young  children  is  extremely  high,  especially  for  those  using  non-parental  care.  This 
stresses the importance  of a dynamic child care policy that  adjusts to the changing 
needs of the mothers of young children.  
 
There seem to be low levels of “unmet” demand for care. Non-attendance to formal 
modes of care, especially for very young children, can de interpreted as a revealed 
preference  on  the  behalf  of  the  agents  for  informal  over  formal  modes,  rather  than 
actual  restrictions  faced  by  families.  However,  poor  families  are  restricted  in  their 
choices. When analyzing the reasons why families don’t choose formal care modes, it is 
apparent that around one quarter of the poorest families face constraints. This implies 
that the observed decisions might not correspond to consumer behavior but rather to 
the  lack  of  alternatives.  The  government  should  continue  their  efforts  to  widen  the 
available  set  of  choices for  low-income  families,  since the  restrictions they  face  are 
more  binding.  Poor  families  also  face  the  hurdle  of  child  care  costs.  This  is  both 
because of the high percentage of the per capita income they represent, and the lack of 
substitutes. 
 
Child  care  choices  have  an  important  effect  on  the  mother’s  working  decision.  This 
aspect has been largely neglected in previous efforts of analyzing ICBF programs. Our 
results show that mode choice has a significant effect on the mother’s employment. The 
use of ICBF, Center and Non-Parental increases the probability of being employed by 
20%,  23%  and  50%,  respectively.  Furthermore,  the  effect  on  employment  status  is 
much  higher  for  low-income  families.  Thus,  special  emphasis  should  be  put  in  the 
pertinent public policies to ensure that low-income families can attain their potential by 
removing the child care obstacle. In addition, effects vary across age groups; for very 
young  children  the  availability  of  an  alternative  care  provider  is  key  to  mother’s 
employment. As children grow the impact of formal care modes increases significantly, 
and the effect of Non-Parental care decreases.  
 
As expected, the mother labor market status has significant effects on the risk of using 
ICBF,  Center  and  Non-Parental  Care,  which  highlights  the  relationship  between  the   37 
work decision and the choice of care mode. Also, maternal work increases the use of 
Non-Parental  care  relative  to  Formal  care  modes,  stressing  the  importance  of  the 
availability  of  Non-Parental  care.  As  the  mother’s  wage  increases,  Parental  care  is 
substituted by other modes. In particular, families turn to formal care modes. As the 
child gets older, the relative risk of using Center care versus Parental increase; when 
children turn 4 years old, the use of Centre Care increases dramatically. This might be 
capturing the normal age at which children are first sent to pre-school. At the same time, 
it suggests family preferences: mothers want someone close to them (Non-Parental) to 
take care of their children, especially when they’re toddlers, despite the availability of 
formal modes. However, as children grow, they tend to favor formal care modes.  
 
This study aimed at shedding light at how Colombian families make their care decisions, 
simultaneously choosing whether the mother works, whether to pay for care and what 
mode to use. The main conclusions are very similar to those obtained estimating the 
equations separately. Some additional features are: (i) Education significantly affects 
the  decision  to  work.  As  compared  to  mothers  with  secondary  education,  lower 
educational levels decrease the probability of being employed while higher schooling 
attainment increases it; (ii) the probability of the mother working increases with child 
age,  especially  when  the  child  reaches  4  years  of  age;  (iii)  the  poor  have  a  lower 
probability of paying for care and hence care costs might be a hurdle for these families, 
given that Sisben levels are important in the decisions of whether to pay for care; and 
(iv) ICBF is vital for poor families, since they have higher the probability of choosing 
formal care. This highlights of the important role played by ICBF for low-income families. 
 
Despite the present effort to characterize the market, an in-depth characterization is 
vital  to  understand  the  underlying  problems  and  market  failure.  Especial  emphasis 
should be put in the study of the characteristics of informal providers, and on the quality-
price distribution across the available choices. This would imply a survey to providers, to 
combine with demand information, to investigate the nature of the child care problem in 
Colombia, and determine the necessary actions to be taken in terms of public policy. 
 
When discussing the future of child care policy in the country, the existence of a trade-
off between the two main objectives of child care should be acknowledged explicitly 
since money spent in enhancing the development and well being of children does not 
necessarily  fulfill  cost-effectiveness  criteria  when  thinking  about  facilitating  the 
employment of parents. The Colombian public supply of child care services does not 
incorporate explicitly the latter objective. Even though it is not as politically correct as 
“guaranteeing children the fulfillment of their basic needs, especially regarding nutrition, 
protection and individual development”
21, it is also a vital role played by these programs. 
It  enables  females  with  young  children  to  work  and  earn  additional  income  that 
generates important improvements in the quality of life of the whole family. 
 
HCB has many aspects: nutrition, early stimulation and facilitating parental employment. 
It is very difficult to ascertain what the optimal design for such a program is, since it has 
to balance the three objectives. An impact evaluation, as proposed by the government, 
is needed to safely calculate the impact of the program in the different dimensions. This 
is particularly important if we want to answer questions such as whether it is desirable to 
                                                 
21 Law 89 of 1988.   38 
moving from the higher quality-more expensive CAIP model towards the lower quality-
less resource per child HCB. 
 
This work is preliminary and it could be improved in many ways. Thus, further steps 
should be taken to ensure the robustness of the results, such as estimating the system 
of simultaneous equations using FIML, given the restrictions imposed by the use of the 
linear  probability  model.  Also,  to  account  for  correlation  between  disturbances  and 
unobserved heterogeneity, following Blau and Hagy (1998), we can assume a common 
structure of the error term. Finally, a non-parametric characterization of the quality of 
care could be performed by treating it as unobserved heterogeneity and estimating its 
kernel density
22. This exercise would be the first approximation to studying the quality of 




                                                 
22 Clearly, we can’t identify individually unobserved heterogeneity and quality.   39 
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Annex 1. Predicted Wages with sample selection 
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The likelihood-ratio test reported at the bottom of the output justifies the Heckman 
selection equation with these data at a 99% confidence level, given the value of the Chi-
squared.  41 
Annex 2. Mother’s Work Decision by Age Groups￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿, /’ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ $￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ X ’￿￿￿￿  ￿￿!
# ￿$% ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿    ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XX ￿￿￿  ￿￿    ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
&￿ ￿ ’(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
(￿ * ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ’￿￿￿  ￿￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿  
G￿ - ￿/￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿M￿ - ￿ ’ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿! ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿&￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ’￿￿￿  ￿￿   ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿  
￿￿￿￿￿(￿ ￿.￿ ￿ * ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ .6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  XXX ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ! ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿(￿ ￿.￿ ￿ * ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ * ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ .6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ’￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿,￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! XXX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XX ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿
￿- ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ X ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ 
￿- ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
&￿ ￿ ’M￿ - ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
&￿ .7 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿! ￿￿ ￿ X ’￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿ ! ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
;￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿;￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿M￿0 ￿ ,￿ 0 ￿￿￿   ￿￿  XX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿    ￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿ XX ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿8￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  XXX ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XX ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
+￿ - ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! XX ’￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ - ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2 2 ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ - ￿￿ ￿ ’￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ’￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ XX ’￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’M￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ - ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿   ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿!
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XX ’￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ XXX ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 0 ￿ W ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 4 ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’￿￿   ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿!￿ ’￿￿   ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ .6 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿Y ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿ ￿￿￿
(￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿+￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
* ￿F￿(￿ < 0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ > ￿F￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
&￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Z￿ ￿￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿￿￿ 0 ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿
&￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿X￿￿ ￿- ￿ ￿2 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿XX￿￿￿￿￿ ￿XXX￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ B C￿ ’ ￿ ￿
￿9￿ ￿ < ￿￿ -, ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ B C￿ ’ ￿ ￿
￿9￿ ￿ < ￿￿￿ ￿, !￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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